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Contact and Conflict on the Atlantic and 
Pacific Coasts of Canada* 
The contact years on the Atlantic coast were spread out over centuries, on the 
Pacific coast over decades.1 European fishermen were probably in touch with the 
Micmacs of Acadia as early as 1500; a handful of French colonists was estab-
lished there by 1650; British settlers arrived in 1750, but the area was not exten-
sively populated by outsiders until the 1780s. Before contact, the number of 
Micmacs has been estimated at anywhere from 16,000 upwards, but after 1600 
the population hovered around the 3,000 mark and stayed remarkably constant 
until recent years.2 The Micmacs, alone among Canadian Indians, fought for 
their lands, holding the British at bay for almost fifty years with the support of 
France, which had conceded Acadia to Britain in 1713 but refused to allow its 
new owners quiet enjoyment of the land. The collapse of French power in 
America ended Micmac resistance.3 At about the same time that the Micmacs 
were adjusting to the reality of British control, the Indians of the west coast — 
upwards of 50,000 in number — were receiving their first visits from Europeans, 
more than 250 years after the Micmacs had first entertained such strangers. The 
newcomers came to trade, and they traded under a number of flags. However, 
the west coast of the nineteenth century did not become the scene of great power 
rivalry on the same scale as had the Atlantic coast in the eighteenth. Inter-
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national disputes were settled by compromise and it was in the interest of no 
party to enlist the Indians in a war on its behalf.4 The west coast Indians thus 
avoided entrapment in European power politics. Some ninety years elapsed 
between the appearance of the first white navigators and the first push of white 
settlement; not as long a period of grace as the Micmacs enjoyed, but longer 
than was granted many Indian peoples. 
The contrast between these two histories is vast, for they occur in different 
times and places, hundreds of years and thousands of miles apart. Time made a 
difference to the principal actors involved. The nineteenth-century European 
was not the same as his seventeenth-century predecessor. The Micmac of 1600 
was patently different from, say, the Haida of 1800. The accommodations that 
whites and Indians made to each other were of necessity affected by these 
differences. The boreal forest of eastern Canada was not the same as the rain 
forest of the west coast, nor could it support the same standard of life. But 
through these disparate histories run several themes that do, nevertheless, bind 
the two together. The process of contact followed a course that was largely 
determined by the coastal nature of the land and its accessibility by sea. Con-
sequently, the shape ofthat experience was markedly different from what it was 
elsewhere in Canada, where the whites approached the Indian residents either 
overland or by seasonal river navigation. The contact experiences on the east 
and west coasts of Canada have more in common with each other than they do 
with similar events in any of the interior regions. 
The first and most obvious similarity was the coastal environment — the 
ocean, the inlets, the rivers, the evergreen forests — that played a critical part in 
determining the life of the Indians and would, one day, mould the life of the 
whites who supplanted them. Drucker's description of the resources available to 
the west coast Indian applies also to the Micmacs: "From the sea and river, fish 
. . . could be taken in abundance. Some of the fish appeared only seasonally, but 
were easy to preserve. The sea also provided a tremendous quantity of edible 
mollusks. . . . More spectacular was the marine game; hair seal, sea lion, sea 
otter, porpoise and even whale. On shore, land game too abounded. Vegetable 
foods were less plentiful, although many species of wild berries were abundant in 
their season".5 However, the Micmacs did not develop as complex a material 
culture on this basis as did the west coast Indians, for the western environment 
was milder and supported a more sedentary life. The Micmacs had no straight 
grained cedar ready for the splitting and had to content themselves with simple 
shelters of bark stripped from their trees. Nor did they develop a complex 
society with the stratification and ceremonial found on the west coast.6 Their 
4 John S. Galbraith, The Hudson's Bay Company as an Imperial Factor 1821 - 1869 (Toronto, 
1957). 
5 Philip Drucker, Indians of the Northwest Coast (New York, 1963), p. 3. 
6 Wallis, Micmac Indians, chs. IV, XI. 
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basic unit remained a band that was little more than an extended family, for they 
were forced to hunt game in late winter each year, and the hunt could best be 
pursued by small groups. But it was for only two months of each year — 
February and March — that the coasts and rivers failed them. When those lean 
weeks were over, they came together in increasing numbers and from April to 
October lived on the coast — usually at the mouth of a river at the head of a bay 
— at village sites to which they regularly returned. In the autumn they began to 
move inland along the rivers, taking fish and waterfowl as they dispersed them-
selves into smaller units to prepare for the winter hunt.7 It was this hunt that pre-
vented the development of Micmac society along west coast lines; that diffused 
authority among numerous band chiefs; that simplified their ceremonial and 
limited their material possessions to what was portable. But it would be wrong 
to depict the Micmacs as a people endlessly wandering the forests in search of 
food, for they had the resources to be sedentary for at least half of each year. It 
would also be wrong to ignore the fact that the natural development of their 
social life was distorted by European intrusions a full 250 years before those 
same influences went to work on the west coast. 
When Europeans came to these coastal people, they came from over the seas. 
Of course, all Europeans came to North America from over the seas, but not all 
the Indians who met them perceived this fact. The stereotype European on the 
coasts would be very different from the one encountered on the inland fringes of 
settlement. Europeans travelled in boats. The people in these boats were male, 
were still domiciled in their country of origin, were in America for a predictably 
short time, and were employees answerable to an authority they had to recognise 
since they would be returning home in a matter of weeks. Their boats were their 
homes in America and they had no need to establish settlements. They did not 
approach the new land in the possessive way pioneers adopted in the interior. 
They had the advantage of a demonstrably superior technology in their ships, 
which enabled them to travel distances that the Indians could not comprehend; 
but this advantage was offset by the fact that, since they had come to the Indians 
(and not vice versa), they were regarded as suppliants from distressed as well as 
distant lands.8 
Throughout the sixteenth century Europeans made landfall in North America 
for shelter, repairs and recuperation. There were probably several hundred land-
falls a year in Acadia by mid-century.9 Trade was an incidental, for the fishery 
was the important economic activity; trade goods were simply the surplus hard-
7 Bernard G. Hoffman, "The Historical Ethnography of the Micmac of the Sixteenth and Seven-
teenth Centuries" (PhD thesis, University of California at Berkeley, 1955), pp. 129-32. 
8 "For if France. . . is a little terrestrial paradise, art thou sensible to leave it? And why abandon 
wives, children, relations and friends? Why risk thy life and thy property?" Chrestien Le Clerq, 
New Relation of Gaspesia, edited by W.F. Ganong (Toronto, 1910), pp. 104-5. 
9 Bernard G. Hoffman, Cabot to Cartier (Toronto, 1961), passim. 
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ware of the fishing industry. Trade for fur and hides became organized in the 
seventeenth century, but its cycle remained geared to the fishing seasons. 
Europeans knew the location of the summer villages and knew where the Indians 
would be each year. Therefore there was no need to establish land posts in order 
to concentrate the Indians for the convenience of traders. The few whites who 
tried permanent posts had difficulty competing with the ship-borne traders who 
found their profit not only in furs but also in fish.10 On the west coast, there were 
differences in detail. Europeans opened trade not as an offshoot of an estab-
lished industry but as a thing in itself. They came with specialised trade goods in 
a few large, specialised ships, and anticipated a lucrative market for their furs in 
China. The difference was partly that of the passage of time: of 150 years' 
experience of trading with the Indians; of superior navigation; of global trade. 
The Hudson's Bay Company founded land-based posts, but these were develop-
ing a maritime pattern of trade until cut short by the great divide of 1846." The 
basics were the same as in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: no desire for 
acquiring land, no incentive for settlement, no motive to displace Indian sup-
pliers. The coming together of European and Indian interests along a narrow 
range of mutual interest was shown by the argot of Micmac, Basque and French 
spoken along the shores of Acadia by 1600, and in the Chinook mixture that 
had achieved the same status along the west coast by 1850.12 Any European 
impulse to remove or annihilate or acculturate the Indians was stifled in these 
coastal areas. 
The evergreen forests that provided the Indians with their material culture be-
spoke a soil too poor to attract European families; the fish that provided the 
staple of life could be harvested from boats offshore; the furs that justified the 
new trade could perfectly well be acquired by the Indians. The process of contact 
began to lengthen out into a routine of trade conducted by European men and an 
Indian society. This type of restricted white contact had some benefits for the 
host people, who might profit from a new efficiency. A fowling piece loaded with 
shot would kill half a dozen ducks that before had had to be taken one at a time; 
a metal cooking pot made a band more mobile in the winter hunt; an iron 
hatchet made a warrior more lethal. But what was done with the extra leisure 
thus gained? In the case of the Micmacs, the routine of life was destroyed by the 
need to hunt for furs at all times of year to pay for trade goods.13 On the west 
10 Nicolas Denys, The Description and Natural History of the Coasts of North America (Acadia), 
edited by W.F. Ganong (Toronto, 1908), pp. 445-6. 
11 For example, Galbraith, Imperial Factor, pp. 135-7. 
12 Marc Lescarbot, Nova Francia: A description of Acadia, edited by H.P. Biggar (London, 1928), 
p. 183; Melville Jacobs, ed., Texts in Chinook Jargon (Seattle, 1936). 
13 Denys, Acadia, p. 442; Calvin Martin, "The European Impact on the Culture of a Northeastern 
Algonquin Tribe: An Ecological Interpretation", William and Mary Quarterly, new ser., 31 
(1975), pp. 3-26. 
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coast, the more efficient European tools led to an efflorescence of art and cere-
monial, but the desire to buy the new goods brought on increased hostility with 
inland tribes.14 
Occasional contacts with the whites promoted change even though no Euro-
pean was domiciled on Indian land; occasional contact also brought disease and 
a rapid loss of population. The decline was not only physical but spiritual as 
well, for the close alliance between the spirits and health in native belief alien-
ated the Indians from their traditional spiritual supports.15 There was a large but 
unknowable decline in the Micmac population in the sixteenth century; certainly 
by 1600 they were aware of being the survivors of a people vastly shrunken in 
numbers.16 The proportionate loss on the west coast was probably not as large, 
but Duff, for example, gives a figure for the whole of British Columbia of 
70,000 in 1835 and 28,000 fifty years later.17 In both areas, however, the Indians 
had enough time to absorb these terrible losses before settlement was upon 
them. If the settler had been paramount, and not the sea-borne trader, these 
losses would have gravely weakened the Indian societies. 
The spread of new disease was the first result of the Europeans' visits to the 
east coast; then came trade goods; then the missionaries. The priests who came 
to Acadia presented a direct challenge to spiritual beliefs already undermined by 
disease, and the newcomers were listened to, since it was assumed that they 
might provide an explanation of the changes that were occurring. These 
missionaries had to live on the charity of the Indians for they had no white 
settlements to turn to; they could not restore their faith in the sanctuary of a 
colonial church, nor attend to the familiar spiritual needs of fellow-Europeans. 
Consequently the early missionaries had to understand and in large measure 
accept the Micmac way of life. There were no "praying villages" where the 
Indians could be grouped in facsimiles of European society in the name of an 
assimilation that would paradoxically save them from the vices of Europeans. 
The purely spiritual impact of the missionaries was further diluted when they 
acted as highly pragmatic war chiefs leading resistance to Britain in the 
eighteenth century.18 There was, of necessity, compromise and a synthesis of 
ideas and ceremonial evolved into a form of Micmac Christianity that the 
14 Fisher, Contact, pp. 20-1. 
15 A thesis ably argued in Calvin Martin, Keepers of the Game: Indian-Animal Relationships and 
the Fur Trade (Berkeley, 1978). This book received the 1979 Beveridge Prize of the American 
Historical Association for the best work on the history of the United States, Canada or Latin 
America. Anthropologists have criticised it severely. 
16 In 1611, Chief Membertou remembered that he had seen Indians, "as thickly planted there as 
the hairs upon his head". Reuben G. Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents 
(Cleveland, 1886), I, p. 177. 
17 Duff, Indian History, p. 39. 
18 Micheline Dumont Johnson, Apôtres ou Agitateurs: La France missionaire en Acadie (Trois 
Rivières, 1970). 
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people could identify with and cleave to as peculiarly their own without doing 
total violence to their traditional beliefs. This Christianity, being French in 
origin and militant in practice, continued to form a line of demarcation between 
Micmacs and English colonists long after the wars were over. 
There was no missionary activity on the west coast in the first sixty years of 
contact. Again, this is partly a matter of timing. The missionary impluse had 
declined somewhat or diverted itself to other areas of the world. But where there 
were settlers in nineteenth-century Canada there were also missionaries, no 
longer going before but with them. The absence of one meant the absence of the 
other, and this had not been the case in the seventeenth century. The delay in 
settlement imposed by the trader also delayed those who would destroy the 
Indian's spiritual world in hopes of his salvation. When settlers arrived on the 
coast, so did the missionary and so did the "praying village".19 But at least there 
had been an intermission during which the Indians had learned to cope with one 
facet of European culture àt a time. 
The delay in the settlement of the two coasts was not entirely due to the prom-
inence of the trader: it was also because the areas took a long time to fit into 
European imperial strategies. Acadia, as it developed in the seventeenth century, 
was overshadowed by Boston just as mid-nineteenth century British Columbia 
lived in the shadow of San Francisco and Portland. The southern coasts were 
staked out first, for there lay natural harbours together with the fertile hinter-
lands that the more northerly coasts lacked. The English fishing industry, when 
it required land bases, found them in New England and provided that area with 
settlers.20 The French put a few dozen colonists in Acadia and reserved their 
major effort for the inland area of the upper St. Lawrence safe from marauding 
navies on the Atlantic shore. Neither France nor Britain had any role for Acadia 
to play until France constructed the fortress town of Louisburg in the eighteenth 
century to cover the exposed flank of Canada. The British, eventually, coun-
tered with their military town of Halifax. On the west coast, the New Caledonia 
department of the Hudson's Bay Company was very much a holding operation 
against Russians and Americans; in terms of the strategy of trade, its function 
was to guard the southwestern flank of the Mackenzie Valley.21 Neither coastal 
area was regarded as of much intrinsic value, but each found a role as protector 
of distant and far richer territories. 
The changes that took place and led to white settlement were fortuitous as in 
neither case were they based on the inherent capacity of the land to support 
white families. The founding of Halifax was a military decision backed by 
£600,000 of public money poured into a neglected corner of the empire in the 
space of six years. Here indeed was a Nova Scotia "gold rush" of immense pro-
19 Jean Usher, William Duncan of Metlakatla (Ottawa, 1974); Fisher, Contact, pp. 132-4. 
20 George Rawlyk, Nova Scotia's Massachusetts (Montreal, 1973), pp. xiii-xiv. 
21 Galbraith, Imperial Factor, pp. 9-11. 
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portions, drawing in profit seekers of all descriptions. When the rush passed, it 
left an exhausted, weak and purposeless colony behind it, but it also left some 
settlers. The British Columbia gold rushes had the same effect on that colony, 
and left the same languor in their wake. Nova Scotia was snatched from 
obscurity by a second fortuitous event, the independence of the United States 
and the expulsion of 30,000 Americans to the last habitable coastal possession 
Britain held on the Atlantic.22 British Columbia waited for a railway, and when 
that came had to wait all over again for the boom decade that began the twen-
tieth century before settlers came in large numbers.23 These sudden influxes of 
population put the Indians in a new light and did so almost instantaneously. The 
Micmacs had long been enemies of the English, but their defeat had not been a 
matter of priority. But once Halifax was founded, its military value depended on 
the British having a firm grip on its landward approaches and the Indians could 
not be permitted to endanger it any more than could the French. The British 
moved in families to back up their military forces. In British Columbia the gold 
rush was quickly followed by the whole paraphernalia of colonial rule, a matter 
previously of no priority at all: the issuing of land grants, the establishment and 
enforcement of British law, the creation of volunteer forces for ad hoc services 
against the Indians. Within a year the old inhabitants of the area had passed 
from being partners in trade to being obstacles to progress.24 
The events that overwhelmed the Indians followed from the coastal nature of 
the two areas. When the blow fell, it fell swiftly. Halifax was to be the North 
Atlantic summer base of the Royal Navy and such it became. The movement of 
people and material in such quantity and with such rapidity could only have 
been accomplished by sea transport, and only the quest for naval supremacy 
could have justified the vast expense. The rapidity of events in British Columbia 
would also have been impossible without sea access. If gold had been found at 
Bow River in 1857, for example, the difficulty of getting there would have dif-
fused the impact on the local Indians and left them with some measure of con-
trol over the situation. Against the mobility and carrying capacity of European 
shipping, the coastal Indians had no defence. 
Throughout the contact period the coastal Indians were peculiarly vulnerable 
to sea power. For one thing, control of the sea determined which group of Euro-
peans would ultimately displace them. Even in the late seventeenth century, 
English shipping dominated the coastal waters of Acadia and made possible the 
repeated attacks on Port Royal that finally gave the area to Britain. Naval 
power made it practical to supply land forces over great distances, whether at 
Halifax or New Westminster. Just as the Royal Navy was the guarantor that 
Nova Scotia would be British, so too was it the guarantor of a British 
22 W.S. MacNutt, The Atlantic Provinces, 1712 - 1857 (Toronto, 1965), pp. 89-95. 
23 M.A. Ormsby, British Columbia: A History (Toronto, 1958), pp. 343, 357-9. 
24 The swiftness of the transition is emphasised in Fisher, Contact, pp. 104-6. 
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Columbia. The navy was not only for use in great power conflicts; it also had a 
role to play in "pacifying" the natives. Land-locked Indians might meet white 
invaders on terms of near military equality, but those on the coast had to be pre-
pared to face floating batteries of cannon and small but well trained landing 
parties of professional fighters. When the Micmacs attacked a trading post on 
the Miramichi River, HMS Viper proceeded to the spot (under French colours), 
put out a long-boat (under American colours, for this was during the American 
Revolution), seized sixteen Indians and carried them off to its next port-of-call, 
Quebec City. Revolutionary efforts to organise a coalition of Micmacs and 
Malecites to fight the British disintegrated as another warship, HMS Vulture, 
made her leisurely progress up the Saint John River.25 On the west coast there 
was a name for this sort of thing: "forest diplomacy". The Royal Navy 
collaborated with the Hudson's Bay Company and, later, the colonial govern-
ments, to keep the Indians in line. When three British deserters were murdered 
by members of the Newitty tribe near Fort Rupert in 1850, a corvette was sent 
to the scene to apprehend the murderers. A landing party drove the Indians out 
of their village and set it on fire. A second expedition returned the following year 
and again "stormed and burned" the camp. Royal Navy ships were sent on 
similar missions against the Indians until the 1880s.26 
The coastal Indians were not without their own means of naval action. The 
sea-going canoes of the west coast are well known, and the Micmacs had sea-
going capability at least from the beginning of the seventeenth century. The 
Micmac canoe was small and not a craft for the open sea; some may have 
crossed the narrow waters from Cape Breton to Newfoundland, but if they did, 
it was more by accident than design. However, the desire for sea travel was so 
strong that among the first European artifacts acquired were shallops (long-
boats) and the Micmacs were adept at handling them in their own sea fishery. 
These boats, oar propelled or under sail, would have the same range and carry-
ing capacity as the largest Haida canoe and enabled the Micmacs to ply the 
coastal waters and short stretches of open sea. A Micmac settlement at St. 
George's Bay, Newfoundland, dates from the 1720s and is the only example of 
Indian overseas expansion: it was made possible by the shallop.27 
Interior Indians defended their hunting grounds, coastal Indians their fishing 
sites and shoreline. When Micmacs seized a number of English fishing boats at 
25 Upton, Micmacs and Colonists, pp. 75-7. 
26 Barry M. Gough, The Royal Navy and the Northwest Coast of North America (Vancouver, 
1971), pp. 90-3; Gough, "Official Uses of Violence against Northwest Coast Indians in 
Colonial British Columbia", in James W. Scott, ed., Pacific Northwest Themes: Historical 
Essays in Honor of Keith A. Murray (Bellingham, Washington, 1978), pp. 43-69. 
27 The first Micmacs that Marc Lescarbot saw in 1606 were sailing a shallop with great skill. 
Lescarbot, Nova Francia, p. 84; Ralph T. Pastore, "Micmac Colonization of Newfoundland" 
(paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Historical Association, 1977); Upton, 
Micmacs and Colonists, pp. 1, 64, 157-8. 
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Cape Sable in 1715 and held the crews to ransom, they justified their action by 
stating that "ye Lands are theirs and they can make Warr & peace when they 
please".28 The shallop was frequently used against the British, and a formidable 
enemy it was, especially if the victim were a two-man fishing dory. A shallop 
could be mounted with swivel guns and a crew of well-armed Indians formed a 
highly mobile strike force. The British fishing station at Canso fell to 
amphibious attack in 1720; in July 1722 Micmacs captured eighteen vessels in 
one coastal sweep and it required two naval sloops to defeat them. The British 
took countermeasures, hiring Wampanoags in whaleboats to terrorize the Mic-
macs. But the fisheries were never entirely safe: on at least one occasion a boat 
was seized off Newfoundland and sailed back to Cape Breton.29 Micmac resis-
tance through the seizure of boats and the killing or capturing of their crews can 
be paralleled by similar incidents on the west coast. The Indians of Clayoquot 
Sound captured an English ship, the Kingfisher, in 1864 and murdered its crew. 
Two warships (one aptly named the Devastation) were sent to take the 
murderers and, in a coastal sweep, killed thirteen Indians and destroyed nine 
villages and sixty-four canoes by shellfire.30 The British did not waste cannon-
balls on the flimsy bark wigwams of the Micmacs, but the west coast longhouses 
were fixed installations worthy of their floating batteries. 
As the period of trade passed, through the medium of sea power, to the period 
of settlement, it is noteworthy that neither coast was acquired from the Indians 
by treaty. The interior of British North America was eventually covered by 
treaties of land cession made in accordance with the royal proclamation of 1763, 
the coasts never. Inland, the process of consultation, gift-giving and promise-
making was regularly performed and recorded with legal formality by govern-
ment agents. With the slight exception of Governor Douglas's private treaties 
covering a small portion of Vancouver Island — treaties that formed no prece-
dent for the public acquisition of Indian land — similar procedures never took 
place on the coasts.31 
Is this more than just coincidence? The British claimed the land of Acadia by 
right of cession from France and made no enquiry into the nature of that title. 
That transfer took place fifty years before the proclamation, but Cape Breton 
and Prince Edward Island were newly-acquired territories in 1763 and Indian 
rights there were simply ignored. The British government made no attempt to 
enlighten the ignorance of successive colonial administrations, and the Indians 
concerned were too few to be of any account. On the west coast, the poverty of 
28 Upton, Micmacs and Colonists, p. 40. 
29 W.A.B. Douglas, "The Royal Navy and the Canso Station" (typescript); Rawlyk, Nova Scotia, 
pp. 126-32; Upton, Micmacs and Colonists, pp.40-5. 
30 Fisher, Contact, pp. 168-9. 
31 Peter A. Cumming and Neil H. Mickenberg, eds., Native Rights in Canada (2nd ed., Toronto, 
1972), chs. 12, 17. 
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the crown colony and the refusal of the imperial government to expend the 
British taxpayer's money led to the straightforward seizure of Indian land, a 
necessity that became a virtue overnight and has remained the law ever since. 
Such resistance as there was in the early days was put down by naval demonstra-
tions and land forces. It could be argued that the military factors that made it 
the better part of wisdom to treat with the inland Indians did not apply on coast-
lines within the range of naval guns, where the British enjoyed as much mobility 
as the Indians and could bring their forces to bear at will. One warship was 
worth a dozen forlornly stockaded posts, isolated and incommunicado in the 
forest wilderness. 
Land cession treaties in the interior were not simply tokens of a change in 
ownership; they were the bench marks of a revolution in the use of an area's 
resources. This change could be plotted, it could be made visible. Not so on the 
coasts: the forest and the sea would still dominate. When the whites did come to 
settle and live off the resources of the coastal lands, they found that they had to 
live within the same bounds as had the Indians. Elsewhere the deciduous trees 
could be levelled and the prairie grasses ploughed for farmsteads, but not on the 
coasts. True, the settler's axe rang out, but the farmer remained peripheral to 
the coastal societies which were as dependent on the forest and the fishery as 
ever the Indians had been. Europeans replaced Indians as the workforce that 
exploited these resources. On the prairies, by contrast, settled farmers replaced 
mobile buffalo hunters as the new people brought a new economy with them. On 
the coasts, employment remained largely seasonal and therefore casual; periods 
of intense activity alternated with idleness in a cycle unknown to the pioneer 
farmer. The transition from Indian to settler economy was to an extent masked 
by an identity of resources. 
The first effect of this identity was to increase tension. Both natives and whites 
prized the same areas because they prized the same resources. "Indian gardens" 
in Nova Scotia — cleared sites of traditional camps — were in the best locations 
for whites as well; the fishing spots best for one were best for the other; control 
of the rivers took an additional importance as whites floated logs on them or 
powered sawmills at the expense of the fish runs. Similarly on the west coast, the 
prime points of white interest exactly corresponded to the Indians'. In the long 
run, the Indians of the coasts might have been expected to adapt to a white 
economy that had a basis familiar to them. While the Micmacs were too few to 
be important as a labour force, they were to be found in the forest industry of 
New Brunswick and were especially valued as log drivers on the rivers. They 
shot porpoises and sold the oil commercially; they fished for profit. They 
worked in wood and sold their wares to the settlers: barrels, axe handles, and, 
later, hockey sticks and pit props. Their woven baskets found a steady market, 
and not just among tourists. They were employed as railway construction 
workers and stevedores. But they were always marginal workers, and in an 
economy that was itself increasingly marginal there was little chance for steady 
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employment.32 On the west coast, Indian labour was the basis of the economy in 
the first generation of white settlement. The scope of employment was similar: 
in the forests, on the docks, in the fisheries. Traditional artifacts continued to be 
made, largely for collectors. New industries such as fish canning employed 
seasonal labour, more successfully on the west coast than the east. The Indian in 
a sawmill is a far remove from the artisan who built a longhouse; but possibly 
not as distant from his ancestor as the buffalo hunter with a hoe in his hand.33 
How far did the coastal fact influence the course of Indian-white relations? 
The sea-borne approach of Europeans imposed different terms of contact than 
that of overland settlers, and different terms of power too. The prolonged gap 
between first contact and significant settlement was not unique to the coasts, for 
it was the common lot of the prairie Indians. But there the power factor was 
missing and the whites had no choice but to maintain a minimal presence for two 
hundred years. On the coasts, the ability to proceed to rapid conquest and rapid 
settlement lay with the Europeans, if they chose to exercise it. Only with the 
building of the Canadian Pacific Railway did whites have an equivalent power 
on the prairies. This power — of mass movement and effective communication 
with established centres — was not exercised on the coasts until many years had 
passed. The topography of the two coasts was of prime importance. Being 
unable to bend the environment to their will, whites directed their colonising 
efforts to parts of the continent that were more amenable to their ways of family 
life. Only accident forced settlers on to the coastal lands, and then they had to 
live on the same terms as the Indians. 
32 Philip K. Bock, The Micmac Indians of Restigouche (Ottawa, 1966), pp. 42-54; William C. 
Sayres, ed., Sammy Louis: The Life History of a Young Micmac (New Haven, 1966); Upton, 
Micmacs and Colonists, pp. 129-30, 173-4. 
33 Although the differences were great enough. As Rolf Knight puts it in his Indians at Work, an 
Informal History of Native Labour in British Columbia, (Vancouver, 1978), p. 16: "Only the 
most unregenerate romantic can. . . find no major difference between the occasional tree felling 
of aboriginal times and. . . commercial logging". See passim for Indian adaptations to a white 
economy; H.B. Hawthorn, C S . Beishaw and S.N. Jamieson, The Indians of British Columbia: 
A Study of Contemporary Social Adjustment (Toronto, 1958); James Spradley and James 
Sewid, Guests Never Leave Hungry: The Autobiography of James Sewid, a Kwakiutli Indian 
(Montreal, 1972). 
